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The consequences of electronic trading, payment and settlement have recently
become one of the main topics in monetary economics. New innovations in
payment and settlement technology are challenging the central bank￿s monopoly
over the supply of base money, which is generally considered the cornerstone of
the central bank￿s power to set the short-term interest rate for the economy. This
paper demonstrates that the development of the economy￿s transaction technology
over time has indeed had a significant quantitative impact on the demand for
currency and bank reserves, and indirectly on the modalities of the supply of
reserves by the central bank. In contrast to past trends, the latest innovations in
payment and settlement technology imply not only a quantitative change but also
a qualitative one, as they enable private institutions to issue settlement money that
competes with the liabilities of the central bank. The paper presents a model on
the implementation of monetary policy in an economy where such private
substitutes for central bank money are available for the settlement of transactions,
showing that effective monetary control by the central bank might indeed be
compromised in those circumstances. However, the study also highlights several
attributes that may distinguish central bank liabilities from any private
alternatives, some of which are based on the central bank￿s traditional role as the
banker for the Government.
Key words: monetary policy, reserve demand, payment systems, financial
innovation
JEL classification numbers: E41, E43, E514
Rahoitusinnovaatioiden vaikutukset reservien
kysynt￿￿n ja korkopolitiikan toteutukseen




Elektronisten maksuv￿lineiden sek￿ elektronisen kaupank￿ynnin ja selvityksen
vaikutukset keskuspankkien toimintaan ja korkojen m￿￿r￿ytymiseen ovat viime
vuosina nousseet yhdeksi rahatalouden keskeisimmist￿ tutkimuskohteista. Koska
keskuspankin valta ohjata rahamarkkinakorkoja perustuu viime k￿dess￿ sen
monopoliasemaan rahaperustan eli talouden perimm￿isen selvitysrahan tarjonnas-
sa, maksu- ja selvitystekniikan innovaatioilla voi potentiaalisesti olla merkitt￿vi￿
vaikutuksia rahapolitiikan toimintamahdollisuuksiin. T￿ss￿ tutkimuksessa osoite-
taan, ett￿ maksuv￿lineiden ja maksutekniikan kehityksell￿ on ajan saatossa todella
ollut merkitt￿v￿ m￿￿r￿llinen vaikutus k￿teisrahan ja pankkien reservien kysynt￿￿n
ja t￿t￿ kautta my￿s keskuspankkien reservien tarjonnan ehtoihin. Uusimmat
tekniset innovaatiot v￿hitt￿is- ja tukkumaksuissa voivat merkit￿ my￿s laadullista
muutosta, sill￿ ne mahdollistavat keskuspankkirahan kanssa kilpailevan yksityisen
rahan liikkeeseenlaskun. Tutkimuksessa mallinnetaan korkopolitiikan harjoitta-
mista t￿llaisessa kilpailevan rahan maailmassa ja osoitetaan, ett￿ yksityinen selvi-
tysraha muodostaa vakavan haasteen keskuspankin mahdollisuuksille ohjata ta-
louden korkotasoa. Tutkimuksessa tuodaan kuitenkin esiin useita tekij￿it￿, jotka
erottavat keskuspankin liikkeeseen laskeman rahan yksityisist￿ kilpailijoista ja
saattavat siten mahdollistaa tehokkaan korkopolitiikan harjoittamisen my￿s kil-
pailevan rahan maailmassa. Osa n￿ist￿ tekij￿ist￿ perustuu keskuspankin perintei-
seen toimintaan valtion pankkina.
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1 Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy through open market operations, in order to
influence bank liquidity and interest rates, presumes a certain institutional and
technological framework that in turn affects money demand function, the money
supply process, and the nature of the transmission process relating short-term
interest rates and inflation. In this study, we analyse how long-run changes in that
institutional and technological framework affect the first two factors, ie money
demand and supply, and their interplay in the determination of the interest rate.
The payment system, including both the major payment instruments in use as
well as the type of value transfer technology, is the main part of the institutional
framework, which affects money demand and supply in the long-run. The other
major factor is the state of development of money markets. Their impact can
clearly be revealed by reviewing the long-run evolution of money demand and
supply models.
The close link between payment technology and money use is inherent in
money demand models, which are based on the assumption that microeconomic
units differentiate in their asset-holding behaviour between those assets that are
and those that are not widely accepted as means of payment by other economic
units. In other words, there is a demand for monetary liabilities issued by the
central bank and deposit banks, even if monetary assets yield no or lower interest
than other financial assets, as money is the only effective medium for settling
transactions in the economy.
The transaction demand for money is crucially dependent on the
sophistication of payment technology. Over decades, advances in payment
systems have enabled a more economic use of cash balances, which is reflected in
the trend-wise increase in the velocity of money. During the last two decades
electronic card payments have substituted for physical cash for larger retail
payments, but for small-value payments physical cash has remained the dominant
payment method. In wholesale payment activity, savings in the use of reserve
balances have been even more profound. With the development of electronic
large-value payment systems and modern money markets, commercial banks￿ free
demand for non-remunerated clearing reserves at central bank accounts has fallen
to negligible amounts. Those developments have induced major changes in central
bank operating procedures, the main tendency being a move from quantitative
targets to short-term interest rate targets. At the same time, the disparity between
the small size of central bank operations and vast volumes in private financial
markets has grown steadily (Annex 1).
Reduced demand for central bank money has not hampered central banks￿
ability to conduct monetary policy, as they have retained the control of
commercial banks￿ settlement balances. The monopoly over the supply of base8
money gives the central bank enormous leverage over the value of transactions in
the economy, even though the size of its balance sheet is small in relation to those
of the private sector. Indeed, many regard central banks of developed economies
today stronger than ever before, and no one in financial markets seems to be
questioning central banks￿ ability to strongly influence the development of
nominal and also real interest rates. Sometimes a mere signal by the central bank
of an intention to change the level of short-term rates in the future can, via the
interest rate expectations effect, strongly influence longer rates.
However, recent developments in payment media and systems underpinned
by advances in electronic technology have brought the wave of change ever closer
to the core of central banking by starting to innovate close substitutes to the
monetary base. Smart debit and credit cards, ie payment cards containing an own
microprocessor memory, facilitate the use of electronic payment cards, thereby
speeding up the velocity of narrow money and substituting for the use of physical
cash. More importantly, smart cards have also enabled the issuing of electronic
cash, which directly rivals physical cash in small-value payments. Similar
developments are going on in the wholesale side, where increased liquidity of
money market instruments combined with further efficacy in payment technology
have already reduced the demand for clearing balances at central banks to a
minimum.
These prospects have alarmed economists and central bankers alike to
consider, whether the development of e-money products and the prospects for
electronic settlement will transform the monetary landscape in a fundamental
way. Are we first moving from central bank money to private e-money, perhaps
initially closely linked to deposit money, then to portfolio e-money and finally to
electronic exchange economy, where money serves no more any role as means of
exchange? Will these developments at the end render central banks obsolete in the
same way that technological advances and commercial liberalisation have moved
other in the past so powerful monopolies out of business? Those questions have
sparked off a lively debate on the implications of e-payments and e-money for
central banking, the main question being whether those innovations could at the
end threaten the ability of the central bank to set the nominal interest rate for the
economy.
1 This paper is also motivated by such questions, both as a survey of and
an addition to the ongoing debate, with the aim of bringing the discussion closer
to the actual practice of monetary policy implementation.
Most of the vast e-money literature has focused on cash substitution and paid
little attention to innovations in large-value payment systems. This is somewhat
striking as interest rate control in all developed countries is based on the central
                                                
1 The 1999 and 2001 Jackson Hole seminars, organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, give a good summary of the challenges that recent advances in information technology pose
for monetary and economic policy.9
bank￿s monopoly over bank reserves, whereas the supply of currency is normally
demand-led. Our focus is innovations in banks￿ reserve demand, the main
question being whether the central bank is likely to retain its control over the
short-term interest rate in a future world, where it might not have full monopoly
over the supply of banks￿ clearing reserves. However, cash substitution cannot be
fully ignored, as currency accounts for the bulk of the monetary base, implying
that its extinction would certainly weaken the central bank￿s position at the core
of the banking system.
We will assume that even in the future e-world some monetary liabilities are
used as a vehicle for settling transactions, but they can be issued competitively by
public and private entities alike. Furthermore, future monetary liabilities might not
be entirely denominated in fixed nominal terms but might also be issued as
￿portfolio money￿, eg as small-denomination securities or as units of value
representing a proportional claim on a set of marketable assets. As the electronic
revolution in banking might ultimately bring about a return to a pure exchange
economy, where money serves no role as a means of exchange, our discussion can
be seen to focus on the period of transition before that final stage. However, as we
estimate this intermediate period to be relatively long, perhaps several decades, it
should be of major interest to central bankers today.
By restricting our focus on the control over the short-term interest rate in a
world where some forms of money will still be used for settlement we can abstract
from many broader macroeconomic issues, which the prospects for e-money and
e-settlement have brought about. For example, we will not address the problem of
price-level determination in a non-monetary world,
2 or the issue of time-
inconsistency in implementing monetary policies in a world with competitive
currencies.
3 Our work has some relation to the literature on free banking in the
sense that we will discuss the role of legal restrictions in enhancing the central
bank￿s monopoly over bank reserves, but we will refrain from any normative
discussion on free banking as such.
The paper is organised as follows. The first part of chapter 2 contains a brief
historical survey on demand and supply models for bank reserves, focusing on the
impact of innovations in transaction technology and financial intermediation. The
second part of the same chapter complements the first one by suggesting that
some deficiencies in private financial markets, due to informational asymmetries,
might provide an additional motivation for demand and supply of public reserves.
In chapter 3, we discuss how modern innovation in payment and settlement
technology may affect the demand for reserves, and what might be the
implications for the operation of monetary policy. That chapter also contains a
                                                
2 Recent papers that have addressed that issue include Woodford (1998) and Costa & de Grauwe
(2001).
3 See Marimon, Nicolini & Teles (1997).10
brief survey of the recent debate on the issue. Chapter 4 focuses on the
implementation of monetary policy in a future environment where close private
substitutes for central bank money are available for the settlement of transactions.
Chapter 5 draws some tentative conclusions on the implications of the new
payment and settlement technology, and suggests some promising future avenues
of research on the topic.
2 The need for reserves
2.1 Demand and supply for reserves
Modelling commercial banks￿ reserve management has a long history, tracing its
early roots to Edgeworth (1888). The rising interest in the issue followed naturally
the evolution in banking in the 19
th century, which developed into fractional
reserve system, where only a portion of overall claims was backed by commodity
money. The rest of borrowed funds were invested at interest in illiquid assets,
such as long-term loans to agriculture and manufacturing. Since that time banks￿
reserve management problem has essentially been to balance the foregone interest
of holding too large reserves against costly stockouts of holding too small an
inventory of reserves.
With the triumph of the Keynesian economics since the 1930s, analysis of
banks￿ reserve needs became closely linked to the growing money demand
literature. The Keynesian theory of money demand distinguished three motives
for holding reserves ￿ the transaction motive, the precautionary motive and the
speculative motive. The early models on the transaction demand for reserves,
pioneered by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), followed an inventory theoretic
approach, where the transaction motive for holding reserves is modelled by means
of costly stock adjustment. In those models reserves are used to pay a stream of
transactions, which is perfectly foreseen. Holding reserves is costly, as there exists
the alternative to invest in interest-bearing bonds. On the other hand, selling bonds
for reserves induces transaction costs, which explain the positive demand for
reserves. The demand for reserves in that framework is explained by the famous








where Y is the volume of transactions, c is the fixed cost per adjustment, r
B is the
interest rate on bonds and r
R is the remuneration on reserve holdings, which is11
usually assumed to be zero. The demand for reserves is positively related to the
transaction volume Y and to the reserve adjustment cost c, and negatively to the
interest rate on bonds r
B.
The simple inventory model is useful in explaining several long-run trends in
banks￿ payment and reserve arrangements. As the transaction demand for reserves
is ultimately due to their use in clearing and settling payments, the need for
clearing reserves by banks is naturally closely linked to the evolution of payment
technology and payment systems, as emphasised by Pauli (2000). As holding
reserves is costly, the main driving force in the endogenous development of
payment arrangements has always been banks￿ need to economise on the cost of
liquidity.
The inventory model predicts three structural factors, which in the course of
years have had a major (negative) impact on banks￿ reserve needs. First, the
model suggests that there exist major economies of scale in reserve management.
A strong tendency towards centralised reserve management within banks and
banking groups is supportive for that conclusion. Second, as reserve needs depend
on the volume of transactions, there is a strong incentive for netting payments
between banks, whose customers are commercially linked with each other. The
efficiency gain of netting can be achieved by using interbank credit in place of
immediate settlement in currency. A third prediction of the model is that lower
costs of reserve adjustment will reduce the need for non-remunerated reserves.
That links the need for clearing reserves closely to the development of the
financial market, in particular the money market.
The netting motive induced banks at an early stage to develop multilateral
cooperative arrangements, where the value of all payments due to and due from
each bank in the network could be settled on a net basis at the close of each day.
For such an arrangement, a central counterparty is needed, against which the
multilateral net position of each participant can be calculated. In the nineteenth
century, such cooperative clearing arrangements developed both in the check-
based (US) as well as in the giro-based (European) payment systems. To
economise on transfers of currency and coin, members of the clearing
arrangement started to keep the bulk of their reserves in the vaults of the central
clearing institution (￿clearinghouse￿), receiving in return clearinghouse
certificates, which could then be used for settlement. As a result of such private
innovation, centralised reserve institutions (￿reserve banks￿) had emerged,
providing reserve accounts and clearing and settlement services to their members.
It is still debated whether the rise of central banks was ultimately an
endogenous process closely intertwined with the emergence of commercial
banking and development of payment arrangements, or whether central banks
reached their position due to the support of privileges and legal restrictions issued
by the Government. Be it either way, early twentieth century clearinghouses
looked in many respects like central banks today. For example, Gorton (1985)12
documents that, in addition to providing clearing services, the New York City
Clearinghouse Association admitted, expelled and fined members, imposed
capital and reserve requirements, and audited members to insure compliance with
the regulations. Further, in periods of distress the Clearinghouse Association
issued loan certificates, backed by bank portfolios, to its members but
occasionally also directly to the public (Timberlake, 1984). In this way, large
amounts of private money could be created and issued to the public in exchange
for demand deposits.
Government sponsored banks, which particularly in Europe were often
established due to political considerations or as bankers for the central
government, had in some respects natural advantages to serve also as a central
reserve institution in multilateral payment arrangements. In particular,
government sponsored banks had the implicit backing by the state implying that
commercial banks￿ claims on the central bank were not subject to a solvency risk.
Furthermore, late 1800s and early 1900s experienced gradual monopolisation of
clearinghouse powers to the government￿s own bank, which strengthened its
position as banker to other banks. First measures were the nationalisation of note
issue and legal tender rules which gave the new central banks the ability to
provide liquidity to commercial banks by rediscounting illiquid commercial bills.
Furthermore, in case of liquidity runs central banks were able to provide lender of
last resort support to banks.
4 Another response to liquidity crisis was the
obligation for commercial banks to hold a minimum amount of reserves at the
accounts of the central bank.
Apart from specific terms of lender of last resort support, the early literature
did not pay much attention to central bank operating procedures, ie to the
modalities of the supply function of reserves. Monetary policy was implemented
via control of the monetary base, which was linked to monetary aggregates
through the money multiplier. Alternatively, the central bank could affect the
money multiplier and money supply by adjusting the required reserve ratio.
However, money supply considerations were not the only motivation for high
reserve ratios that were generally applied in those days. There was also a
persistent fear that banks￿ voluntary reserve holdings will stay too low to stand
large deposit withdrawals. Equilibrium in the money market is then given by the
equality of the interplay of demand and supply of money, where money demand is
                                                
4 However, note monopoly alone was not always sufficient to ensure efficient monetary control for
the young central bank. For example, monopoly over note issue was reserved for the Bank of
Finland in 1886. Despite that, Korpisaari (1920) documents that in the following decades the
central bank was not able to strongly affect commercial bank lending rates in normal times, as
banks had no need for central bank financing. However, during recessions the central bank￿s grip
over commercial banks strengthened due to higher need for liquidity. At that time, last resort
lending during periods of financial distress was often conceived as the most important function of
the central bank.13
a function of the income and the interest rate and money supply is an exogenous
constant fixed by the central bank. Equating money demand and supply for each
income level then produces an upward-sloping portfolio balance schedule (LM-
curve), which can be affected by changes in nominal money supply.
In later contributions, the simple inventory model was extended to incorporate
elements of uncertainty. For example, Tobin (1958) used portfolio approach to
show that the demand for reserves is not only a (negative) function on the interest
rate on bonds but also a (positive) function on the uncertainty of returns for
alternative investments. If a bank has two assets, non-interest bearing reserves, R,
and earning assets, A, yielding r
A, higher volatility of r
A induces greater demand
for reserves. Olivera (1971), Miller and Orr (1966) as well as Frenkel and
Jovanovic (1980) continued to model the demand for reserves in the same
tradition but assumed that net disbursements are governed by a stochastic process
that leads to a need for precautionary reserves. Some of those models suggested
that an increase in payment uncertainty might result in higher demand for
reserves.
The growth of an efficient market for trading banks￿ reserve balances induced
a major reformulation in modelling banks￿ reserve management. Given that
central banks normally paid no interest on reserves and charged high penalties in
the case of reserve deficiency, banks had a strong incentive to balance daily
interbank positions between themselves. However, another prerequisite for the
birth of efficient reserve trading was the development of the payment
infrastructure to the stage, where banks could forecast their daily balances with
some accuracy. This stage was first reached in the United States, where the
growth of the Fed funds market in the 1960s provided banks the option to adjust
reserve positions among themselves by buying or selling 1-day money with low
transaction cost (bid-ask spread). Given that option, banks￿ were no more willing
to hold non-interest bearing reserves for the settlement of anticipated transactions,
if the yield on overnight funds or short-term Treasury bills was high enough to
cover the transaction costs of interbank trading. Instead of transactions demand,
the precautionary demand due to uncertainty about the size of future deposit
withdrawals became crucial for the existence of excess reserves. Furthermore, as
overnight funds began to trade at a market rate that was determined by supply and
demand, it became evident that the discount rate affects the funds rate through its
influence on the demand for reserves.
Poole (1968) was the pioneer to extend the inventory model of reserve
demand in order to take into account the role of an efficient money market. He
examined the significance of excess reserves, commercial bank borrowing from
the central bank, and the central bank lending rate (the discount rate) as a problem
of bank reserve management optimisation under stochastic demand. The model
assumes that the representative bank￿s day-to-day adjustment of its reserve
position takes place in the interbank overnight market and through borrowing14
from the central bank. The model considers the optimal amount of reserves that a
bank is willing to hold as a consequence of uncertain deposit levels. Holding
reserves yields a return to the bank by preventing costs from unexpected deposit
drains, but the other side of the bargain is the opportunity cost of reduced
interbank lending. The problem the bank faces is to allocate its liquid funds
optimally between reserves and interbank lending on the basis of costs and returns
related to different assets.
Most of the models examining commercial bank reserve management up to
present day are adaptations of Poole￿s seminal contribution, which can be briefly
outlined as follows. The representative risk-neutral bank has beginning of day
settlement balances (ie deposits net of loans), D, and needs to decide at the
beginning of day how much to invest in the overnight money market at the
interest rate r
on and how much to maintain as excess reserves R. Bank￿s deposits,
credit lines, and loan repayments are all subject to random shifts without notice,
with net bank withdrawals defined as X, with the density function f(X). If net
withdrawals exceed reserves, that is, X > R, the bank must access a central bank
discount window, at a rate r
L, (r
L > r
on). The bank chooses its reserves to maximise
profits, π, such that




− − − = π (2.2)
The first-order conditions of this problem result in a reserve quantity that satisfies
the condition





The first-order condition states that the probability of a reserve deficiency must
equal the ratio r
on/r
L. This is the essential condition that must be met in reserve
management models.
Poole noted that for a symmetric distribution with E(X) = 0, for the optimal
reserves to be positive, it is required that r
L > 2r
on. This finding greatly helped to
understand how the structure of central bank standing facilities (eg the discount
window) affects banks￿ reserve demand. At that time, central banks￿ credit
windows were typically a mixture of interest-rate costs and administrative
penalties, which effectively induced a rising cost function for borrowed reserves.
In normal circumstances, the above inequality is unlikely to hold, in which case
the model predicts negative reserves. The model also helps to understand the role
of discount rate changes and open market operations in the conduct of monetary
policy. For given discount rate r
L, the central bank can affect a rise in the15
overnight rate r
on by increasing the probability of reserve deficiencies through
liquidity-absorbing open market operations. However, such operations cannot
push the overnight rate higher than to the level of the discount rate. Alternatively,
the central bank can raise the discount rate, which automatically raises the
equilibrium overnight rate without any change in the liquidity position of the
banking system. This can be seen from equation (2.3), where bank￿s reserve
management is dependent on the ratio of the overnight rate to the discount rate,
but not on the absolute level of either rate. Hence, Poole￿s (1968) model explains
how the central bank can affect market rates either through a liquidity effect or a
pure signalling effect.
In the vast literature on bank reserve management, the basic model by Poole
has been extended to include various aspects, which could be of importance in
reserve management decisions. Some of the earlier applications incorporated legal
reserve requirements, which were already studied by Poole. Another strand of
literature added costly collection of information on customer habits, which can be
used to reduce the variance of the underlying subjective distribution of stochastic
withdrawals. More recently the emphasis has shifted to examine how
modifications in central bank standing facilities and operating procedures affect
the determination of overnight and longer-term market rates. There are two
natural reasons for this shift in emphasis. First, central banks have generally
shifted to interest rate targeting, where the day-to-day operational target is a short-
term money market rate, such as the overnight rate. Secondly, the application of
rational expectations in financial markets has helped to understand how the
central bank can influence long-term rates through signalling its intention to
change the level of short-term rates in the future. This implies that communication
on the future trend of central bank rates can be as, or even more, important for
private economic behaviour than actual changes of those rates today.
One way to achieve high transparency in interest rate policy is to set an
explicit target for the overnight rate, as the Federal Reserve has done, and to use
daily open market operations to steer the actual path of the overnight rate to
follow the target level. However, given a desire to discourage borrowing from the
central bank, Poole￿s result implies a rather high effective discount rate r
L. In such
a framework, shocks in reserve demand induce large swings in the overnight rate
between 0 and r
L. Even a very accommodating liquidity management policy by
the central bank cannot fully eliminate such swings, as even the central bank is
unable to perfectly forecast aggregate reserve shocks. That problem of interest
rate volatility is accentuated in smaller countries, where the interbank market is
less competitive than in the United States.
One possible response to that problem is to introduce a reserve requirement
with averaging provisions. Commercial banks can be required to hold a share of
their liabilities as minimum reserves on accounts with the central bank. Allowing
averaging provisions implies that the compliance with the reserve requirement is16
judged by the average of the daily balances a bank has on its reserve account
during the maintenance period. Averaging provisions give banks the possibility to
borrow funds at a low rate to build up excess reserves at the beginning of the
maintenance period in the expectation that they could lend funds at a higher rate
later in the period. Speculation of this type can be expected to reduce the range of
possible fluctuation of the overnight rate, except for the very end of the
maintenance period, when averaging ceases to be effective.
However, due to financial liberalisation and increase in banking competition,
there has been a general tendency to reduce or even totally eliminate mandatory
reserve requirements. Given these trends, central banks have started to provide
reserve supply facilities, which allow banks to target zero reserves on average.
Such ￿channel￿ systems recognise that in a world with fully efficient money
market the only reason why banks need to deposit or borrow costly reserves at the
central bank is the uncertainty related to daily payment flows. Therefore,
predictability of reserves rather than the absolute amount of reserves is crucial for
the design of central bank operating procedures. Assuming a symmetric
distribution for stochastic payments, the central bank can achieve its target
overnight interest rate by supplying on average zero reserves within an interest
rate corridor, where banks are allowed to deposit and borrow reserves overnight at
constant interest margins to the target rate.
The ￿channel￿ system is an extension of Poole￿s reserve management model.
The central bank chooses a target overnight interest rate r
on, which is periodically
adjusted in response to changing economic conditions. The discount window is
replaced by a marginal lending facility, through which the central bank stands
ready to supply an arbitrary amount of settlement cash at a fixed interest rate r
L,
which is slightly higher than the target rate. The only limitation for the use of this
facility is the availability of adequate collateral. Also, commercial banks that clear
transactions through the central bank have the right to deposit excess settlement
cash overnight with the central bank at a deposit rate r
D, which is slightly lower
than the target overnight rate. The lending rate on the one hand and the deposit
rate on the other define a channel within which overnight interest rates should be
contained. Furthermore, the spread between the lending rate and the deposit rate
gives banks an incentive to trade with one another.
In the channel model, a representative risk-neutral bank chooses its reserves
to maximise profits, π, such that:
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Thus, the equilibrium interbank overnight rate of interest is simply the average of
the two rates of the standing facilities weighted by the probabilities of the money










where R is the quantity of reserves targeted by the bank as a function of the
overnight rate in the money market. The cumulative distribution function F(￿R)
represents the probability of a reserve deficiency. The fact that the cumulative
distribution function F is increasing means that R will be a decreasing function of
r
on.
Symmetry of the probability distribution of possible levels of net withdrawals
implies that each bank will target a zero level of reserves if the overnight rate is
exactly halfway between the deposit rate and the lending rate. Hence, a reserve
target of zero on the part of the central bank should achieve an overnight rate
equalling the target rate, given appropriate positioning of the two standing facility
rates. Another prediction of the model is that the demand for reserves should be a
function of the location of the overnight rate relative to the lending rate and
deposit rate, but independent of the absolute level of any of these rates. This
implies that the central bank needs not change the supply of reserves in order to
adjust the level of the overnight rate, as long as the location of the lending and
deposit rates relative to the target overnight rate do not change.
5
The channel system facilitates the separation between interest rate policy (ie
adjustments of present and signals of future interest rates) and pure liquidity
management, where the central bank uses open market operations to supply an
aggregate quantity of reserves, which corresponds to the estimated demand for
settlement cash at the target overnight rate. By use of the channel system the
central bank can control overnight interest rates without having to engage in large
transaction volumes through either of the standing facilities; the central bank￿s
willingness to transact in large volume largely eliminates any need to do so. The
move to the channel system reflects a response to lower demand for non-interest
bearing reserves and higher demand for transparency in implementing monetary
policy. Hence, it is no surprise that central banks, which have adopted inflation
                                                
5 This is a reconfirmation of Poole￿s result where the representative bank￿s reserve management is
dependent on the ratio of the overnight rate to the discount rate, but not on the absolute level of
either rate.18
targeting and ruled out minimum reserves, have been the first to adopt the channel
system in monetary policy implementation.
6
2.2 Liquidity models and the need for public reserves
The discussion above suggests that nowadays commercial banks￿ remaining
demand for central bank reserves is only due to residual uncertainty in daily
payment flows, which is likely to be further reduced by future advances in
payment technology. However, the theory of central banking has since its advent
suggested a more fundamental precautionary motive for holding central bank
liabilities, namely the potential for private market failure, which may render
private and public liquidity imperfect substitutes in periods of distress. That issue
is closely related to the long discussion of the elasticity of money supply and the
need for a public lender of last resort, the history of which can be traced back to
England in the latter half of the eighteenth century.
7 At that time, in addition to
the Bank of England also private commercial banks were allowed to issue paper
notes, which comprised their main liability before deposits became commonplace.
The main question was to find mechanisms that would prevent banks from
expanding their private note issues excessively. The dominant view had been that
banks should restrict their lending to the discounting of bills with a clearly short-
term commercial purpose (the so-called real bills doctrine). This policy was
believed not only to prevent the oversupply of currency but also to bring about
sufficiently elastic supply to meet the fluctuating needs of trade. Moreover, it was
generally believed that market discipline would prevent banks from oversupplying
their notes, because if they were suspected of doing so the public would want to
convert its note holdings back to specie.
However, it was soon recognised that the amount of currency in circulation
had nevertheless been excessive from time to time, causing undesirable increases
in the price level. Therefore, an alternative policy to anchor the issuance of paper
money more closely to the amount of specie gained acceptance. According to this
view, which soon became the dominant one, price stability could best be
guaranteed by a legislation, which prevented banks from issuing notes in excess
of the size of their metallic reserve. However, while accepting this baseline
policy, Thornton (1802) argued that there should also be a central authority with
discretionary powers in order to guarantee sufficient elasticity of money,
especially in times of crises. This was one of the first statements about the need of
a public lender of last resort.
                                                
6 Those countries include Australia, Canada, Sweden and New Zealand.
7 See Niskanen (2001) for a more extensive discussion of the history of the concept of the lender
of last resort.19
The structure of banking changed profoundly during the 1800s, as joint stock
banks emerged to provide long term financing for industrial projects, whose ex
post outcome was difficult to monitor. In order to reduce those information and
monitoring costs, commercial banks started to extend loans on a fixed nominal
value basis, irrespective of the contingent outcome of the project (Goodhart,
1987). The initial, and subsequent valuation of the loan by a bank does depend on
information that is generally private between the bank and its borrowers, or only
known to the borrower. Thus the true asset value of the bank￿s non-marketed
loans is always subject to uncertainty, though their nominal value is fixed. Under
these conditions it benefited banks to denominate also their deposit liabilities in
fixed nominal terms, as that increased the covariance between the value of bank￿s
assets and its liabilities. However, the combination of long-term assets with
uncertainty of their true value, together with nominally convertible deposits
rendered banks very vulnerable to liquidity crises in case of adverse news of their
unknown asset values.
Indeed, in the leading industrial countries the 19
th and early 20
th century was a
time of frequent banking crises, which involved the actual or expected restriction
of the conversion of deposits into currency. The birth of central banks was partly a
response to such severe banking crisis. Gradual monopolisation of note issue and
legal tender brought the new central banks the capacity to offer liquidity to
commercial bank￿s in case of emergency. Being able to create currency, the new
central banks could guarantee the exchange rate between bank deposits and
currency against system-wide runs. However, this capacity could not be used if
the central bank was required by legislation to strictly anchor note issues to the
amount of gold reserves. Indeed, critics of the legislation argued that anchoring
the amount of paper notes to the size of gold reserves had in fact increased the
propensity of bank runs, because the public could not be certain that the central
bank would provide support when other banks had difficulty in redeeming their
deposits. Against that background, Bagehot (1873) argued that the central bank
should admit its responsibility as holder of the country￿s bank reserves and to
commit, by public announcement, to lend freely in the face of a bank run. In order
to increase confidence in the financial system, he advocated the following
principles for central banks￿ lender of last resort support:
1 lend freely during a crisis,
2 assist any and all sound borrowers,
3 lend against all acceptable collateral (evaluated at it￿s value in normal times),
4 apply penalty rates for assistance,
5 assure the markets in advance.
Bagehot￿s lender of last resort principles have considerably influenced central
bank policy worldwide. However, these principles were never universally20
accepted, and the debate on the conditions, under which the central bank should
offer liquidity to banks, has continued up to present day. The unresolved issues
extend from the need for a lender of last resort at the first place to the
compatibility of last resort lending with the price stability objective. Furthermore,
it is disputed whether the long-run costs of moral hazard outweigh the short-term
benefits of emergency liquidity support. Against this background, it is no surprise
that central banks￿ actual lending policies differ, both as regards regular liquidity
support to the banking sector as well as the policy applied in crisis situations.
Many central banks have moved towards applying the Bagehotian criteria for
regular credit facilities, but this trend is not universal.
8 As regards actual financial
crises, the US Federal Reserve was strongly criticised for not providing sufficient
amounts of liquidity at the beginning of 1930s, when the public lost its confidence
in the country￿s banking system. In other cases of severe banking crises several
central banks have applied lender of last resort criteria, which are actually less
stringent than the Bagehotian criteria.
The basic puzzle has been to explain why private markets are prone to
episodes of financial crises, characterised by the collapse of activity in the
financial sector, along with reductions in real output, consumption, employment
and other components of real activity. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) were the first
to formalise the idea that the structure of financial intermediation might be
inherently unstable and, thereby, could be a cause to economic crises. Their model
has an explicit economic role for banks to perform: the transformation of illiquid
assets into liquid liabilities. Their model demonstrates that banks issuing
uninsured demand deposits can improve on a competitive market by providing
better risk sharing among people who need to consume at different random times.
But, the demand deposit contract has an undesirable equilibrium (a bank run) in
which all depositors panic and withdraw immediately, including even those who
would prefer to leave their deposits in if they were not concerned about the bank
failing. Such bank runs are costly and reduce social welfare by interrupting
production (when loans are called) and by destroying optimal risk sharing among
depositors.
As the bank run equilibrium in the Diamond and Dybvig (D￿D) model is
essentially a coordination failure, it can be easily eliminated by an appropriate
correction mechanism. Indeed, it has been shown that under some restrictive
assumptions both a temporary closure of the bank, a governmental or other
credible insurance mechanism and a central bank acting as lender of last resort
can be applied as a way to eliminate the possibility of runs. Therefore, under some
                                                
8 For example, the Eurosystem employs a marginal lending facility, which is accessible for all
financially sound credit institutions against eligible securities and at a rate of interest higher than
the market rate. All conditions for the use of the marginal lending facility are preannounced. In
contrast, lending through the Federal Reserve discount window is of discretionary nature.21
restrictive assumptions, the D￿D model that focuses on the nature of the deposit
contract provides a rationale for government supplied liquidity. However, the
D￿D model as such is inappropriate to address the issues related to the demand or
supply of liquidity in the future e-world, where financial markets are even more
developed than today and private banks have the option to issue e-money.
However, some recent extensions of the model have some bearing on the demand
for private and public liquidity in those surroundings, and we will review those
applications briefly in section 4.4.
Other models use credit market imperfections, resulting from informational
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders, to motivate corporate demand for
liquid assets. Those models are related to the vast literature on credit rationing,
which makes the point that investment will be constrained by the firm￿s net worth.
Due to an information asymmetry, the firm￿s external value is less than its internal
value, resulting in underinvestment and credit constraints. Holmstr￿m and Tirole
(1998) have applied the same idea to motivate the demand for liquid funds by the
private sector. That demand has to do with the illiquidity of long-term
investments, and the fact that intermediate investment outlays may be needed to
finalise projects. Firms hoard liquid assets to be able to clear such intermediate
investment needs. The opportunity cost of holding liquidity is optimally balanced
with the costs related to premature termination of investment projects (bankruptcy
costs and the like).
Liquidity models complement the traditional money demand literature by
providing an additional precautionary reason for private agents to hold liquid
assets. However, as such they do not provide a special motive for holding central
bank liabilities, if liquid assets in the private market are full substitutes for public
funds. Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1998) use the liquidity model to demonstrate that
when there are aggregate shocks the private sector may have a shortage of liquid
assets. In that case the government can improve welfare by providing the private
sector with liquid assets (bonds) that they are unable to create themselves. The
government should manage debt so that liquidity is loosened when the aggregate
liquidity shock is high and is tightened when the liquidity shock is low.
3 Potential implications of e-revolution
3.1 Retail payments and e-cash
Users of payment services consider a wide range of attributes in choosing which
payment instrument to use. According to Marquardt (1994), the key attributes are
explicit user costs, float benefits, opportunity costs, speed of settlement,
complexity and convenience of use, susceptibility to loss or error, privacy, and22
wide acceptability. Traditionally, cash has been superior to any other means of
payment in several of these attributes. Above all, legal tender provisions have
guaranteed total acceptability of cash
9 and, in addition, cash payments provide
immediate and final settlement of transactions. In traditional models of money
demand the main disadvantage of cash arises from the loss of interest revenue.
Indeed, there is some evidence that the high interest rate regimes of the late
1980￿s and the early 1990￿s were a spur to the development of cash substitutes
(Markose and Loke, 2001). On the other hand, traditional models would predict
that consumers cease to substitute away from cash as nominal interest rates on
demand deposits fall close to zero.
However, traditional models of money demand have largely overlooked the
evolution in the microstructure of the payments technology, which, in the course
of years, has also had a major impact on the transaction demand for money.
10 On
the retail side, worldwide trend has clearly been towards substitution of non-cash
payment instruments for cash, driven by the spread of debit and credit card
payment methods (Snellman, Vesala and Humphrey, 2000). Those payment
instruments are linked to the payers￿ bank accounts or credit lines extended by the
card issuer. Since cash is most often used for everyday small-value retail
purchases, card payments via EFTPOS terminals are its closest substitute in
modern payment systems. The incentives for replacing physical notes and coins
with alternative means of payment do not only, or perhaps not even primarily,
arise from potential savings in interest costs, but from the high costs of handling
physical cash.
11 These have to be contrasted with the costs of credit verification,
bookkeeping and communications with the central operators of the system in the
case of debit and credit cards.
Due to network externalities achievement of wide acceptability is a crucial
condition for any new payment media to become a serious rival for physical cash,
the use of which is backed by legal tender provisions. It took some 20 years for
credit and debit cards to reach wide usage, and even so they have not been able to
compete with cash in very low value payments. In addition to verification,
bookkeeping and communication costs, the use of EFTPOS instruments is
restricted by rather high fixed costs due to restriction to physical point of sale use,
non-standardised card transaction infrastructure, high cost of terminals and
vertical fragmentation of markets according to customer groups.
                                                
9 Goodhart (2000) has emphasised the role of legal tender provisions that facilitate the use of
currency as a generally accepted means of payment, making it extremely hard for any alternative
means of payment to reach same degree of acceptability.
10 Recent empirical studies on money demand give strong evidence that institutional change
represents an important element in explaining the long-run behaviour of velocity or the demand for
money. See Bordo, Jonung and Siklos (1997) for references.
11 The research and consulting company Ovum has estimated the global cost to banks, retailers and
customers of handling, counting, recording, storing and moving physical cash as $30bn.23
The smart card, which contains a tamper-proof embedded microprocessor
with its own memory, has opened new potential in the development of retail
payment media. It is a very secure and flexible method of carrying data, which
can be accessed only when it is connected to a separate terminal, which, however,
needs not be a physical connection. Next to mobile phones, the payments industry
is the second largest user of smart cards, not only for secure credit and debit
payments, but also for electronic cash. In addition, smart cards can be used to
provide secure access to computer networks. In addition to advanced security,
smart payment cards have or will have other attributes, which are likely to give
wider acceptability and lower transaction costs compared to traditional magnetic
stripe cards. The new technology enables multipurpose cards, which for example
carry electronic cash on the same card as the debit and credit card, thereby
lowering the cost and increasing the convenience of card usage. In Europe, the
creation of a common market for financial services and the arrival of the single
European currency have induced card issuers to start developing single European
standards for debit and credit cards, as well as for electronic purses.
12 Such
standards will allow cardholders to make payments in any country, facilitating
positive network externalities for such payment medium.
The latest rival for physical currency is the e-cash, which avoids the physical
handling costs associated with currency. Furthermore, just like currency,
electronic cash cards carry purchasing power, which is valid independently of
holders￿ bank account, thus avoiding verification and bookkeeping costs
associated with debit and credit cards. To some extent, electronic technology has
also facilitated the use of cash, mainly via the build-up of ATM (Automated
Teller Machine) networks, which have enhanced the convenience yield of cash
and reduced potential interest rate losses by increasing accessibility to cash closer
to point of sale. However, technological and market development is clearly
working for electronic payment medium in several respects. First, electronic
payment means may soon outpace physical cash in security. Second, as regards
transaction costs, the gap between transfer costs for physical cash and for
electronic information is widening on an accelerating pace. Third, with the
development of mobile communication technology the use of electronic payment
media will no longer be tied to physical terminals, so that it becomes usable
￿everywhere￿, just as physical cash is.
13 Actually, with the rapid internalisation of
banking and electronic payment networks, electronic payments and e-money can
reach global acceptability, whereas wide acceptability of physical cash is
                                                
12 Debit and credit card applications comply with the EMV standard developed by EuroPay
International, Mastercard and Visa International. Electronic cash applications mainly comply with
the common electronic purse standard (CEPS).
13 The leading producers of mobile phones have recently unveiled innovative new phones, utilising
GPRS technology, that provide electronic wellets for mobile commerce.24
contained within national borders, or within the boundaries of larger currency
areas, as in the case of the European Monetary Union.
14 Last but not least,
commercial banks have strong incentives for developing e-money schemes, not
only due to potential cost savings, but also due to chances of reaping float income
from money issues.
As shown by Santomero and Seater (1996), the demand for alternative media
of exchange can be studied in a Baumol-Tobin type model of optimal money
holdings. Santomero and Seater study the behaviour of a representative agent who
can choose to pay for purchases among different generally accepted payment
instruments. Their model suggests that media of exchange usage patterns depend
on income levels and consumption patterns, which suggests that we should expect
different reactions across economic groups to the newly emerging e-money
schemes. Various households offered a new medium of exchange with its own
implied interest rate, transaction costs, and fixed cost will react differently. Thus,
there appears to be room for different combinations of media of exchange. As the
government supplies only one type of money, the market creates different types of
private money or quasi-money to satisfy the heterogenous demand.
Berentsen (1998) has used a simplified version of Santomero and Seater￿s
model to study specifically the demand for e-money. Assuming that the use of
digital money for purchases will be free for consumers, the demand for e-money
MEM is reduced to the standard Baumol-Tobin square-root formula:
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According to (3.1), the demand for digital money depends on the costs of
transferring funds into digital money on a smart card or a computer hard drive,
aEM, total digital money spending, A, and the interest differential between the
savings asset and electronic money balances, rs ￿ rEM.
The costs of conversion, aEM, include opportunity costs of time spent for this
activity and per transaction fees charged by the issuer of digital money and/or by
the provider of the telecommunication service. Berentsen suggests that these costs
are likely to be small and will decrease further as technology improves and smart
card readers are more widely distributed. Therefore, e-cash has the potential to
dominate physical cash for small value transactions in the near future. On the
other hand, the total demand for e-money will likely be small due to low costs of
conversion. The demand for e-money also depends on the total amount of digital
money, A, spent in each period. Due to that network externality the total demand
                                                
14 Note that the internalisation of government money (legal tender) is a politically driven process,
whereas the internalisation of private e-money is a market (demand) driven process.25
for e-money is likely to remain small for a long time, but it could eventually grow
rapidly as e-money substantially replaces currency. Indeed, numerous pilots for e-
cash have not been commercial successes so far, but that has in no way hindered
the development of new e-money schemes. Due to the existence of network
externalities, estimates on the speed of e-money penetration differ significantly,
the most optimistic being that in only 4￿5 years electronic cash has achieved
usage levels that are common for debit and credit cards today.
We can conclude that smart cards and, above all, e-cash are challenging the
superiority of physical cash in regard to several attributes, which users consider
important for the choice of payment media. Goodhart (2000), however, has argued
that even an extensive advance of information technology would not totally
eliminate the use of currency. He has pointed out that currency is a completely
anonymous means of payment in the sense that the recipient of a cash payment
neither has to know nor learns anything about the counterpart in the process of
trade. By contrast card and e-money transfers immediately provide a record of
what a customer has bought to the seller and to the underlying financial
institution. As currency usage is widely represented by holders who do not wish
their activities to be tracked, Goodhart found it implausible that the demand for
currency would dry totally. However, even if Goodhart￿s point would be valid as
such, it cannot be used to save physical cash in the case, where it is only used to
settle illegal transactions. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons why banks prefer
the new common electronic standard for e-cash applications is that it provides an
audit trail to protect them against illegal laundering of money.
3.2 Large-value payment systems and demand for bank
reserves
As currency is the main component of the monetary base, its replacement by
electronic payments and electronic money would have major implications for the
central bank.
15 It would shrink the central bank￿s balance sheet and remove the
seignorage income accruing from the issuance of non-interest bearing money.
This raises the question whether the central bank would retain its ability to control
monetary developments in a future cashless society. Several authors have argued,
that the central bank would not lose its control of short-term interest rates in a
cashless society, as currency is not a meaningful operative target in the conduct of
monetary policy in developed societies (Henckel, Ize and Kovanen (1999),
Goodhart (2000), Freedman (2000), Woodford (2000)). Rather, the central bank￿s
ability to move large financial markets through limited open market operations is
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based on its monopoly position as a supplier (and withdrawer) of bank reserves
rather that to the supply of banknotes. This monopoly over the supply of bank
reserves gives the central bank leverage to the growth of bank deposits and credit,
and thereby to the nonfinancial economy as well.
The central bank￿s monopoly over commercial banks￿ reserves is based on a
historical evolution of payment systems, driven by banks￿ needs to economise on
the cost of liquidity through pooling their reserves on the accounts of a central
reserve institution, namely the central bank. Despite far-reaching changes in
payment arrangements over the decades, the central bank with the right to issue
publicly guaranteed claims and the capacity to lend clearing funds in case of need
is still capable of providing value-added for liquidity and safety in large-value
payment systems. Provided that the central bank￿s settlement function continues
to guarantee an ongoing demand for reserves, e-money would not seriously
threaten the efficacy of monetary policy, which would be implemented very much
like today.
However, the central bank￿s core position as bankers￿ bank and its monopoly
over commercial banks￿ settlement balances have not remained immune to
technological and payment innovation. As emphasised by Goodfriend (1991) the
evolution of the payment system has been driven by efficiency gains from
substituting credit, ie claims on particular institutions, for commodity money.
Indeed, since the time of early clearinghouses, banks have used bank money or
clearinghouse money to clear customer and interbank transactions.
16 In modern
interbank net settlement systems, banks that net their mutual payments provide
liquidity to one another by implicitly accepting claims on each other. It is apparent
that banks have been willing to accept some credit risk for the substantial
efficiency gains that the use of credit instruments in place of cash has afforded. In
a net settlement system, inside clearinghouse money is created continually as
banks with net credit positions provide implicit credit to banks with net debit
positions. Clearinghouse money is strictly endogenous; it expands or contracts as
needed to accommodate the volume of transactions and the changes in the
distribution of net debit positions among participants. Such net debit/credit
positions remain provisional until banks settle their positions which takes place at
discrete intervals.
Interbank payments do not become final until they are settled. The present
convention is that mutual interbank positions are settled at the end of each day
through banks￿ accounts with the central bank, ie by transfer of an offsetting
                                                
16 A more recent evidence that private banks have the ability to set up a clearing and settlement
mechanism in the absence of the central bank is the creation of the ECU clearing and settlement
system in 1985. As there was no central bank for ECU at that time, commercial banks had to set
up a system of their own to clear ECU interbank payment orders. EBA Euro 1 is the successor of
the ECU clearing and settlement system.27
amount of central bank funds. In some countries, the use of central bank funds is a
legal requirement for interbank settlements. As regards the EU, Principle 5 of the
1993 Report by the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member
States of the European Economic Community, entitled ￿Minimum Common
Features for Domestic Payment Systems￿, stipulates that ￿Provided they settle at
the central bank, large-value net settlement systems may continue to operate in
parallel to real-time gross settlement systems￿￿. Such a stipulation, which is
primarily motivated by risk considerations, is actually a stronger requirement than
legal tender. Central bank issued banknotes must be accepted as final payment for
debt, but legal tender does in no way prohibit the use of private money (bank
deposits, e-cash) for final settlement of payments. In contrast, Principle 5 of the
minimum common features stipulates that central bank issued money must be
used for final settlement of interbank debt obligations.
Whereas private innovations in payment arrangements have tended to
substitute interbank credit for costly clearing balances at central banks, recent
public intervention has favoured the use of gross settlement in central bank
money. In 1980s, supervisors of payment systems started to pay attention to the
fact that claims resulting from the netting process generate interbank credit risks if
customers￿ accounts are credited before corresponding payment cover is
transferred between banks. It was noted that net settlement systems give rise to
settlement risk, as final settlement of the net payment amounts in not
accomplished before the end of the day. As financial liberalisation and integration
had led to an explosion in the number and value of payments, interbank overdrafts
in net settlement systems had in many cases reached alarming magnitudes. As a
way to eliminate settlement risk, supervisors started to advocate final intraday
settlement of large-value payments at the central bank.
Availability of liquidity is crucial for smooth real-time gross settlement, as the
value of fund transfers that occur during any single day is typically several times
the underlying bank reserves available for final settlement.
17 Averaging of reserve
holdings for purposes of meeting required reserves and permitting intra-day use of
all reserve balances for payment settlement purposes helps in satisfying some of
the demand for intraday reserves. However, without a relatively accommodating
provision of intraday credit a RTGS system would impose undue costs on banks
and on their customers. These costs stem from either the cost of banks￿ holding
liquid assets, or from the time cost associated with delay of payments as the
required reserves for settlement are amassed. For this reason, many central banks
extend large amounts of intraday liquidity usually at low cost. Thus, the move
from net settlement to gross settlement has effected a substitution of public
intraday liquidity for private credit. Furthermore, these developments have
                                                
17 For example, the average daily value of TARGET transactions reached EUR 925 billion in
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enhanced the role of central banks at the core of the payment mechanism as an
increasing share of large-value payments is directly settled in central bank money.
3.3 E-money and monetary control
A review of present trends and future prospects for electronic payments and e-
money suggests that further innovation in e-technology may well bring about
fundamental changes in private means of exchange and settlement, both at the
retail and at the wholesale level. Those developments may at the end challenge the
unique position of the central bank as the issuer of the ultimate settlement
medium. As the central bank￿s ability to control commercial banks￿ settlement
balances and short-term interest rates is based on the unique characteristics of its
liabilities, such prospects have raised an active discussion on the implications of
e-payments and e-money for central banking.
A recent essay by Friedman (1999) initiated the debate whether electronic
money will threaten the ability of central banks to control the value of their
national currencies through conventional monetary policy. Friedman began by
contrasting the small volume of bank reserves and central bank operations in the
US with the vast volume of financial and nonfinancial transactions in that country.
The standard explanation for central banks￿ ability to affect such large markets
through such small operations is their monopoly position as a supplier of base
money ￿ cash and bank reserves. Friedman pointed out that the development of
new payment and banking technologies is rapidly advancing to the point where
there are a variety of visible alternatives to conventional bank money as a means
of undertaking transactions. Regarding e-money, he emphasised that the crucial
moment might be when different smart card systems, or other forms of e-cash,
advance to the point where they would provide not merely payment but also
settlement.
Friedman also studied the role played by interbank clearing mechanisms in
creating a demand for reserves. Private settlement systems, such as CHIPS in the
US or Euro1 in the EU, run along and compete with the large-value payment and
settlement systems provided by central banks. Such private mechanisms for
clearing interbank accounts could in principle evolve into systems of purely
bilateral transfers among private banks or issue clearinghouse money or
collateralised clearinghouse credit for settling interbank claims, thereby avoiding
the need to use central bank money for final settlement. King (1999) went even
further by suggesting a future world where all transactions could be settled by
real-time transfers of private wealth from one electronic account to another.
Technological advances would then have enabled a move to an electronic barter29
economy, where a separate means of exchange (money) would no longer be
needed.
18
Most studies on the implications of e-technology for central banking do not
go that far, but assume that some electronic money will still be needed as means
of exchange. However, contrary to current world, money will be issued
competitively in electronic form by private issuers as well as the central bank. The
unit of account (eg one dollar, one euro) remains a national affair and is provided
by the state, as there are overwhelming arguments to maintain a common measure
of value. The central bank who continues to issue its own money in a competitive
environment, tries to practice monetary policy by a Taylor-type rule whereby it
adjusts the short-term interest rate in response to movements in expected inflation
and the state of economic activity. The crucial question then is whether the central
bank will any longer be able to set and move the general interest rate in the
economy, or merely to influence the price at which its own liabilities exchange for
other circulating monies.
Goodhart (2000) has argued that even in the case where the demand for
government base money would completely evaporate, the central bank would still
be able to set the country￿s nominal interest rate. His argument relies on the fact
that the central bank is the government￿s bank, and thus has the power to
intervene in financial markets without concern for profitability ￿ a power that no
commercial bank has. Even if all payments in the economy were carried out by
private e-money, the central bank could bid or ask the rate for this e-money to the
desired level, as it can accept more losses than its commercial rivals can. Further,
for Goodhart the ability of the central bank to control interest rates is ultimately an
issue of political economy. If the government wants to maintain the power of the
central bank, it can set up necessary legal restrictions and organise the structure of
the financial system to do so.
Freedman (2000) also reasoned that the central bank would be able to exert
influence on the very short-term interest rate even in a world with completely
private settlement. His argumentation is related to Goodhart￿s point that the
central bank as a public, non-profit oriented institution is always able to keep the
overnight rate at the desired level. He emphasised that the incentives facing banks
when they have a surplus or deficit of settlement balances at the central bank are
crucial for the central bank￿s influence over the very short-term interest rate.
These incentives depend on terms and conditions imposed by the central bank.
Referring to channel systems, such as employed by the Bank of Canada,
Freedman then pointed out that the central bank can control the policy rate even if
the average demand for net settlement balances is close to zero. This can be done
by establishing a corridor for the overnight interest rate through unlimited standby
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as other weights and measures today.30
facilities, where the central bank is prepared to accept overnight deposits at a
certain rate of interest, and to extend overnight loans at a higher rate of interest. If
need be, the central bank￿s position could be strengthened if the government
would continue to settle its own payments on the books of the central bank.
In contrast, Costa and De Grauwe (2001) argue that the capacity of drawing
on the resources of the state alone will not allow the central bank to regain its
control over the short-term interest rate in a future world of competing currencies.
They point out that in a cashless society where central banks do not have any
specific role in the monetary process anymore, there is no apparent reason for
banks to hold reserves at the central bank. At present, the central bank can offer in
principle unlimited lending and borrowing facilities, as any use of those facilities
has an impact on banking liquidity and thereby on interest rates. Hence, in
practice the use of those facilities will always remain limited. In contrast, when
money will be issued competitively, the central bank￿s operations will no more
affect liquidity of other banks, as it has lost the power to create the ultimate means
of payments. If the central bank wished to lower the interest rate, it would need to
borrow the funds itself in the market at the market rate and lend them back at the
lower target rate. As such an operation would not affect the equilibrium market
rate, it would only set in motion a profitable arbitrage by other banks, who would
borrow cheaply from the central bank and lend the same funds dearly in the
market. The willingness of the treasury to bear the losses of the central bank
would only make the size of these arbitrage activities larger, without creating
added liquidity. Costa and De Grauwe conclude that if the central bank is only
backed by state￿s financial support, it will lose its traditional instruments of
monetary policy in the world where money is issued competitive by private
financial institutions.
Woodford (2000) shared the views of Goodhart and Freedman, that even very
radical changes in payment technology as might someday develop are unlikely to
interfere with the conduct of monetary policy. Like Freedman￿s, Woodford￿s
analysis is also based on monetary policy operating mechanisms under a channel
system such as described in Annex 2, where the adjustment of the level of
overnight rate by the central bank does not require any change in the supply of
settlement cash. This implies that changes in the level of overnight interest rates
can be effected simply by announcing a change in the target overnight rate, and by
changing the lending and deposit rates at the central bank￿s standing facilities in
tandem. Such channel-based monetary policy implementation systems do not
require the central bank to be able to vary the spread between the return on other
assets and that on bank reserves, and therefore do not depend upon bank reserves
fulfilling a unique function that gives the central bank monopoly power. From this
Woodford draws the conclusion that while advances in information technology
may well require changes in monetary policy implementation techniques in
countries (eg the United States) where central banks still steer short-term rates via31
changes in reserves, the ability of central banks to control inflation will not be
undermined. And the method of interest rate control in channel systems of
countries like Canada, Australia or New Zealand should continue to be effective,
even if the demand for settlement balances falls to zero. Woodford￿s key
explanation that those mechanisms should work in a world where central bank
liabilities serve no unique function is that there is no inherent ￿equilibrium￿ level
of interest rates to which the market would tend on its own in the absence of
central bank intervention.
Referring to Keynesian IS-LM -framework, Friedman (2000) attacks
Woodford￿s ￿indeterminacy￿ argument that the central bank can fix the overnight
rate in any possible future environment since the market on its own has no
inherent equilibrium interest rate. In the traditional Keynesian framework the
(real) interest rate is indeterminate along the saving-equals-investment schedule
(the IS curve), so that the central bank is in principle free to establish the interest
rate wherever it wants by appropriately positioning the portfolio equilibrium
schedule (the LM curve). Indeed, Friedman interprets Woodford￿s and
Freedman￿s idea of ￿infinitely elastic￿ provision of loans and deposits at the
central bank target rate (or at a minuscule spread) as an effort to impose on the
economy a portfolio balance schedule that is approximately horizontal. However,
in the traditional Keynesian money demand analysis, the LM curve turns vertical
in a situation where the own-rate on money balances is varying exactly in step
with the return on alternative assets. If the demand for money is unaffected by the
interest rate, the LM curve is vertical, and at given level of aggregate demand the
money market clears at any level of interest rates. In a sense Woodford￿s
indeterminacy argument can be turned around: if any possibly interest rate is the
￿equilibrium￿ rate, how can the central bank whose liabilities no more serve other
functions than privately issued e-money, to dictate its terms in the money market
without resorting to transactions in infinite volume.
4 E-finance and the future of central banking
4.1 Legal restrictions and the demand for reserves
A school of economists, most notably Wallace (1983), have long ago claimed that
the demand for money is ultimately a product of various legal restrictions and
regulations on money and finance. Without such restrictions and regulations, the
distinctions between banks and other non-bank intermediaries would vanish, and
the conceptual differences between deposits and other assets would also become
meaningless. Those economists go further to argue that legal restrictions are also
responsible for the peculiar nature of currency, namely its non-interest bearing32
form. They predict that the imposition of a competitive note issue would either
bring nominal interest rates to zero or force non-interest bearing central bank
currency out of circulation. If commercial banks were free to issue private money,
holders of central bank money would exchange their non-interest bearing public
notes for interest bearing private notes. The central bank could then by open
market purchases force its own non-interest bearing notes back into circulation,
since they are legal tender, but holders of those notes would continue to exchange
them for private notes until the interest rates of private notes would have fallen to
zero. Alternatively, the central bank￿s non-interest bearing notes would be forced
out of circulation, and would be replaced by privately issued interest bearing
notes.
Wallace also argued that monetary policy ￿ defined as central bank asset
exchanges accomplished through open market operations or discount window
lending ￿ matters only in the presence of those legal restrictions on private
intermediation. Suppose that government monopoly of currency issue and reserve
requirement no longer exist, and a common constant-cost technology for the
production and distribution of small-denomination bearer notes is available to the
government as well as private intermediaries. Consider now an open market
operation, whereby the purchase of Treasury bills is made by issue of currency
notes. This would not lead to an increase in the money stock, as private
intermediaries will offset one-for-one the government issue in the open market
operation by scaling down their note-issue operations. This argumentation
suggested that legal tender alone is not sufficient to guarantee effective monetary
control by the central bank in conditions of laissez-faire.
We still have non-interest bearing banknotes in circulation, and positive
nominal interest rates, which might tempt to the conclusion that the arguments of
the legal restrictions school were flawed after all. However, it is interesting to
note that in the wholesale bank reserve market where electronic trading and
settlement have become the norm years ago, the first prediction of Wallace has
been pretty much validated. With the development of the money market and the
ability of banks to monitor their intraday balances, commercial banks have largely
replaced non-interest bearing reserves at the central bank for interest-bearing
market reserves. Indeed, the free demand for non-interest bearing reserves has
fallen close to zero in all countries with advanced money markets and payment
systems. But contrary to the second prediction, this development has not wiped
out the central bank￿s ability to influence bank liquidity and to steer short-term
interest rates.
Following the tradition of the legal restrictions school, one may well argue
that even the present interest rate control is due to various restrictions on private
intermediation, which force banks to exchange private reserves for public reserves33
for the purpose of settling interbank transactions.
19 The force of regulation is most
easily seen if one looks at the typical conditions for central banks￿ regular lending
facilities. Let￿s take the Eurosystem as an example (see Annex 2). The
Eurosystem offers a marginal lending facility, through which it stands ready to
supply an arbitrary amount of overnight settlement cash at a fixed interest rate,
which is considerably higher than the market-clearing overnight rate. The credit is
granted against full collateral, which consist of government bills and bonds as
well as other low-risk assets. It is easily recognised that in the absence of any
restrictions on private intermediation and settlement, such a credit facility would
be of no value. A bank in need of funds could simply borrow privately on such
collateral at better interest rate terms with no trouble. In that environment there
would be demand for central bank money only if it would be provided at
competitive terms. For example, the central bank￿s credit facility would be used
only if the interest rate were lowered to the market level or, alternatively, the
central bank would lend against riskier collateral than the market practice.
Goodhart and Freedman may be right in arguing that the regulatory power of
the Government will be sufficient to maintain the central bank reserve monopoly
even in the future e-world. However, it is likely that the costs of regulation will
grow over time with increasing sophistication of financial market and payment
systems. Such costs are most visible in case of reserve requirements where even a
small wedge between the market rate and the remuneration on required reserves
can induce delocation and disintermediation effects. In the case of today￿s
settlement obligations distortion effects are less evident, as forced settlement in
central bank money is aimed at correcting a serious market failure, namely the
threat of systemic risk in payment systems. However, given the advanced state of
financial markets and the large availability of liquid funds, there is no
fundamental technological or financial obstacle to settle any transactions by
                                                
19 Reserve requirements are another instrument that central banks have used to force a stable
demand for their liabilities. Views on the usefulness of this instrument in the e-world differ
considerably. Woodford (2000) claims that, in order to maintain the clearing of payments through
the central bank, reserve requirements would need to be abandoned when innovations in payment
mechanisms have reached the stage, where any cost differential above a small ceiling would result
in a complete abandonment of methods of payment requiring the use of central bank balances. On
the contrary, Costa and de Grauwe (2001) envisage an enhanced role for legal reserve
requirements in the e-money world. They suggest that in order to maintain the power on monetary
affairs, the central bank will have to expand its supervisory control of any money issuance,
independently of its type or origin. As a part of this extended control reserve requirements would
be applied to non-traditional types of money, such as e-money. In practice this means that a certain
percentage of high-quality e-money should be deposited at the central bank. Required e-money
balances would be remunerated with an interest rate below but close to the market rate. However,
Costa and de Grauwe also recognise that in a cashless society characterised by fierce competition
and internationalisation of the financial market, the use of this instrument of monetary control will
anyway remain limited.34
means of other assets than central bank money.
20 One alternative would be to use
liquid Treasury securities as a means of exchange in a gross-settlement
environment. As Henckel et al. (1999) have pointed out Treasury money is rapidly
becoming an alternative monetary unit to central bank money as a liquid reserve
asset. In an efficient money market, banks can obtain clearing funds by
conducting repurchase operations with Treasury bills, which have same-day
settlement, or by selling Treasury bills for liquidity. Given real time information
on the price of Treasury securities and further advances in payment and settlement
technology, the limitations for using Treasury money to directly settle interbank
positions are less and less technological, but just due to common value-day
conventions, which are subject to change in case of need. Another option would
be to use private e-money, which might be backed by high-quality securities or
commodities, for final settlement of transactions.
If private agents are able to provide settlement arrangements, which are as
safe and effective as settlement through central banks, there is less base to oblige
gross settlement in central bank money. Indeed, payment system regulators are
also envisaging new options, as the recently launched Core Principles for
Systematically Important Payment Systems by the BIS Committee on Payment
and Settlement Systems demonstrate. Namely, the Core Principle 6 of the 2001
recommendations states that ￿Assets used for settlement should preferably be a
claim on the central bank; where other assets are used, they should carry little or
no credit risk and little or no liquidity risk￿. In the new principles for payment
systems settlement in central bank money is still the preferred option but no more
an obligation, as was stipulated by the EU Minimum Common Features for
Domestic Payment Systems less than a decade earlier.
4.2 Interest rate determination in a multireserve economy
How then might monetary policy be carried out in tomorrow￿s economy, where
private institutions issue e-money, that can be used not only for payment but also
for final settlement of any transactions. It is not easy to see how the economy￿s
                                                
20 We take the view that finality of payments is ultimately a legal concept rather than something
linked to the nature of the medium that is used to settle the transaction. The act of settlement
determines an ordering of claims on bank assets. Settlement is final provided that once the transfer
of funds from the net debtor bank to the net creditor bank has been executed, remaining creditors
of the sending bank cannot recover the transferred funds should the bank fail. Typically, net
settlement systems employ complex techniques of contract modification to rearrange the original
payment obligations with the aim to achieve higher efficiency in execution and to lower the risk of
settlement failure. For example, appropriate collateral and mutual guarantee arrangement in EBA
Euro1 insure finality of payments for the clients of Euro1 banks. See Green (2000) for an
extensive discussion of the issues involved.35
payment infrastructure will be structured at that stage, but the existence of large
network externalities suggests that in equilibrium only a few providers of e-
money and other settlement services will survive. As a first approximation of the
future, we assume that the (few) competing settlement systems will function
pretty much like today. The main difference is that the host for each settlement
system has the capacity to issue its own e-money, which all users of the system
accept for final settlement of all payment orders in the respective system. The
systems can be either net or gross settlement systems, and banks as well as other
users of payment services are free to choose which system to use. However, a
move from one system to another is likely to be a long-run decision, as it includes
both time lags and transfer costs. For simplicity, let us assume that only two
competing settlement systems are in operation, the first run by the central bank
and the second by a private settlement agent, for example a consortium of major
commercial banks.
Similarly to today, an individual bank can obtain clearing funds by borrowing
from the money market or alternatively by borrowing from the respective
settlement agent. In a standard way we assume that the overnight trading is
conducted by a walrasian auctioneer at a certain point of time during the day. The
clearing rate used by the auctioneer is the representative overnight rate for that
day. Prior to the clearing time, banks are free to move funds between the two
settlement systems and from money market to settlement accounts and vice versa.
Public and private e-money trade at par in the money market, so that a single
overnight rate r
on exists. Immediately after the clearing the money market and
settlement accounts are closed.
Banks face a continuum of distinct and independently distributed liquidity
shocks during a banking day. We assume that banks have the ability to monitor
their reserve balances in real time. This implies that the uncertainty about the end-
of-day reserve balances is entirely due to the net effects of the liquidity shock (X)
occurring after the clearance of the markets. In other words, we follow the present
practice by assuming that financial markets are effectively closed before the bank
knows the whole extent of its reserve gains or losses. The expected value of the
shock is zero. The banking system is closed in the sense that a positive liquidity
shock for one settlement system implies a corresponding negative shock for the
other system. End-of-day credit balances are unremunerated in both settlement
systems. Furthermore, overdrafts are forbidden, so banks cannot have debit
balances on their settlement accounts with the central bank at the end of the day.
End-of-day debit balances need to be cleared by the use of a marginal lending
facility, which both settlement agents provide at rates 
L
CB r  and 
L
EM r , respectively.
Let us now consider the representative bank￿s short-run reserve management
problem. The bank has settlement balances (deposits net of loans), D, and needs to
decide the allocation of its liquid funds between interbank lending and reserve36
balances at the accounts of the two settlement agents. The bank allocates its
excess reserves R so that δR are held at the reserve account with the central bank,
which leaves (1￿δ)R for the private system. The representative bank￿s optimal
policy can be achieved as the first order condition of the bank￿s profit maximising
problem, which can be written as:
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The first order conditions with respect to excess reserves and their allocation for
the competing settlement systems are:
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Aggregation over the unitary mass of banks gives the market-clearing overnight
rate as:





on δ − − δ − + δ − δ = (4.3)
where F(￿δR) and F(￿(1￿δ)R) represent the probabilities of the banking system
being overdrawn with optimal reserves and their allocation in the public and the
private settlement system, respectively. We note that the equilibrium overnight
rate is determined by the weighted average of the lending rates set by the
competing settlement agents. Weights are influenced by the probabilities of
ending at debit positions in competing settlement systems as well as by the
allocation of reserves between the two systems. The central bank can still
influence the overnight rate by changing its lending rate or by affecting the total
amount of reserves, but its control of the overnight rate is only partial, as it has no
more monopoly over the supply of clearing funds. The model can be
straightforwardly extended into a world with n providers of settlement funds in
which case the central bank￿s influence over the short-term interest rate would
become even more limited.
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We see that the optimising bank chooses its reserve allocation in order to balance
the probability of ending the day with debit balance with the relative cost of
excess vs. borrowed reserves, respectively for both systems.
This simple model is useful in demonstrating that fundamental changes in the
economy￿s transaction technology might indeed endanger the central bank￿s
control over monetary conditions. With a straight-forward extension of Poole￿s
reserve market model it focuses on the precautionary demand for reserves in
competitive but almost identical settlement systems, distinguished only by the
interest rate applied on borrowed reserves. However, the model is extremely
simplistic description of the future reserve market, as it mechanically projects the
present payment infrastructure into a future environment with more than one
supplier of settlement funds. In order to judge the realism of the model, we first
have to consider whether a precautionary demand for reserves will continue to
exist in tomorrow￿s e-world as assumed in the model. Clearly, the precautionary
demand for reserves by banks is related to uncertainty of daily payment flows,
which will not be totally removed by further advances in technology. One source
of uncertainty is changes in the amount of banknotes held by the public. This kind
of uncertainty will remain as long as some form of e-cash issued by the banking
sector will be circulating in the economy. However, as cash holdings by the public
normally follow a seasonal pattern, changes for that liquidity item are relatively
easy to forecast. Furthermore, as suggested by the model by Berentsen, the stock
of e-cash in circulation is likely to be low (due to its high velocity), so that daily
(net) withdrawals of e-cash will only have a limited impact on liquidity. Other
source of uncertainty is related to incoming payments, which are not under the
control of the receiving bank. As in today￿s environment, there is always a slight
risk that some payments due today are not received in time so that their value date
is shifted one day forward. The most simplistic reasons for such a risk are
technical or human errors. In some cases a payment is routed via different
payment network (eg correspondent banking) implying de facto a change in the
value date. At the extreme there is also the risk of the payer bank failing during
the trading day.
Another issue concerns whether there will be a significant general shortening
of the time lag between trade and settlement and whether that would
fundamentally change the nature of the reserve market. Today, we have well-
defined value dates for different kinds of financial transactions, closely linked to
the present hub-and-spokes structure of the economy￿s payment systems.
Normally, transactions at the spokes (eg customer, securities and forex payments)
are effected with value dates t+1 or higher. Only transactions at the hub (the
central bank or the private interbank settlement system) are carried out with same
day settlement, implying that the reserve market in a narrow sense can also be
defined in terms of value dates. In other words, the reserve market is restricted to38
overnight and short-term depo trading between commercial banks and liquidity
transactions between commercial banks and the central banks, settled at same day
value. However, a more efficient securities settlement technology allows a general
shortening of value day lags. Indeed, it cannot be excluded that in the future
Treasury bill or other liquid securities would be traded at same day value, as
interbank deposits today. Though, as long as the present hierarchy of payments
networks as well as ultimate settlement in central bank money is maintained,
change in value dates will not change the nature of reserve trading even if it
clearly adds to the deepness of that market. But the option of trading Treasury
bills at same day value is only one step away from starting to settle directly by
transfers of those securities rather than first exchanging Treasury bills for central
bank money for final transfer of value.
A related and perhaps the most crucial issue concerns the choice of settlement
media by private agents. This is clearly the main difference compared to the
present environment where we can simply assume a well-defined demand for
central bank money due to the structure and regulation of the economy￿s payment
infrastructure. For the future, we have first to model the transaction demand for
competing settlement media to see which types of monies are the most likely to be
used for settlement. For such an analysis, one has to assume some differences in
the quality of competing monies. Furthermore, the transaction demand for money
is positively related to the market share of that particular money in the settlement
of the economy￿s transactions, as the use of any settlement medium is clearly
associated with positive network externalities. Another interesting extension
would be the introduce some risk premiums for circulating currencies, which
might render the system asymmetric in the sense that issuers of more credible
settlement funds could have relatively higher influence over monetary conditions.
As Costa and de Grauwe have pointed out, a society with several monies trading
at fixed rates can be paralleled to a system with fixed exchange rates in the
absence of capital controls. As we know from the history of fixed rate currency
areas, such as the EMS, the ￿anchor￿ country often has disproportional influence
over monetary conditions for the whole currency area. To receive that anchor
position, the central bank of that country has to accumulate a strong reputation as
a supplier of strong currency, that maintains its purchasing power over time.
The discussion above suggests two conditions for the central bank to gain
influence over interest rates in a multireserve world. First, the central bank should
have a large market share in the supply of the economy￿s settlement funds.
Second, and surely as a precondition for the first approach to have any success,
the central bank needs to have a reputation as an issuer of solid money. We will
next preliminarily review a few factors, which might increase the transaction
demand for central bank money as well as enhance its credibility in relation to
privately issued currency in the future e-world. The discussion is very tentative,39
just highlighting a few issues, which might be of relevance for the central bank￿s
position in a society with competitive supply of money.
4.3 The central bank as banker to the Government
In many countries, especially in Europe, central banks that emerged in the 18
th
and the 19
th century were initially very closely tight to Government finance
(Kindleberger, 1984). They acted as the bank of issue for the Government, and in
many cases they issued notes that were, in effect, state debt. Also, in a historical
perspective, there is a clear correlation between the status of the central bank and
the role of the central government in the economy. Therefore, if we are returning
to a competitive money economy, it is natural to consider whether the position of
the central bank as the Government￿s bank will again distinct it from its private
competitors. In principle, the Government can back the central bank￿s position at
the core of the banking system in several interrelated ways. As pointed out by
Goodhart, one distinctive feature is the central bank￿s ability to bear higher losses
than private banks as those losses can be covered through state budget finance.
Indeed, in a competitive environment this element might become quite crucial, as
the central bank could only induce a large demand for its liabilities by supplying
its money at preferential terms in comparison to market price. This is in sharp
contrast to the present situation, where legal tender provisions, reserve
requirements and settlement regulations guarantee a large demand for central bank
liabilities at zero or low interest rates.
However, it is very questionable whether the central bank in practice could
ever intervene in large volumes without any concern for profitability. As noted by
Friedman, the central bank￿s balance sheet is already limited in relation to vast
financial markets and the gap between the two is to widen considerably, if public
banknotes are replaced by private e-cash. If the future central bank, a small player
in the market by that time, tries to move the market price through its own
operations, it could easily be engaged in unfavourable large-scale arbitrage
against private players, as has been suggested by Costa and De Grauwe. It is
indeed questionable whether the taxpayers would be willing to bear the costs of
such a game.
21 And even it the central bank could gain some influence over the
short-term interest rate by means of limited unprofitable intervention, running
financial support by the Government is a double-edged measure, as it could
threaten the independence of the central bank.
                                                
21 Numerous unsuccessful defences of fixed exchange rates against private speculators
demonstrate that central banks are normally not willing to pursue unlimited intervention to support
their monetary policy goals.40
Another common argument in favour of a public currency is that claims on
the central bank are not subject to a solvency risk, which makes the public more
willing to hold central bank liabilities than private ones for ultimate settlement of
transactions. For this reason, only private monies with no possibility of default are
likely to be successful in competition with government money. Indeed, issuers of
private money seem to be using two principal ways to de facto remove the
possibility of default for their money. The first way is to issue private money by a
consortium of trustworthy deposit banks, which are more or less directly insured
by the government (eg through a deposit insurance scheme).
22 The second way is
that privately issued money is backed by tangible assets, such as precious
commodities.
23
If the public is only willing to accept default-free monies, there is no obstacle
in principle for financial intermediaries to issue money against the full backing of
riskless government debt. In that case, the money-issuing institution could be
organised as a mutual fund with simultaneous payment facilities. Its assets would
consist of risk-free government securities, against which it would issue interest-
bearing small-denomination unit shares, which could be used for payments.
Actually, such mutual funds have existed for some time, but the idea of
incorporating payment facilities to mutual funds has not caught on yet to any great
extent. As pointed out by Goodhart (1993), the reason for that might be that bank
clients prefer their assets to possess nominal certainty, so they know what
potential outward cash flows they can meet without difficulty. This argument may
indeed be valid for retail customers, who are only used to accounting in nominally
certain units. Nominal certainty is less relevant for wholesale payments, and
particularly for interbank payments, as bank are used to mark-to-market
accounting and have cash management facilities that can easily incorporate the
use of market-valued money.
24
                                                
22 For example, in Finland the Avant Electronic Cash system is operated by Automatia Ltd.,
owned by the three largest banks of Finland, which jointly have nearly a 90 per cent market share
in deposits.
23 E-gold and GoldMoney are examples of commodity backed payment systems, in which
payments made on the internet are completely backed by gold or, in the case of e-gold, also other
precious metals. A quantity of e-gold or, in the case of GoldMoney, GoldGrams, constitutes title to
a precise weight of the physical metal which can be used to purchase goods and services. These
systems enable their users to make instant, non-repudiable payments to anyone around the world at
any time via the Internet.
24 The idea of using money backed by government securities for the settlement of interbank
transactions is not far from present-day practice. As commercial banks are no more willing to hold
non-remunerated clearing reserves at central bank accounts, the liquidity for gross settlement of
transactions is mainly provided by the central bank in the form of intraday credit against full
collateral, most of it consisting of public debt securities. In principle, a private settlement agent
could easily replicate such a collateral system, and provide intraday liquidity for settlement of
transactions on its accounts.41
The discussion above suggests that the default-free argument alone might be
inadequate to safeguard the dominance of central bank money in an economy with
a competitive money supply. However, as Goodhart has emphasised, there is
another avenue for the Government to promote the status of its own bank as the
prime settlement agent in the economy. If the Government always requires
payment in the form of a claim on its own bank, there will be a strong reason for
the commercial banks to keep settlement accounts and reserve balances with the
central bank. The Government is the largest financial operator in any modern
society, and due to tax collection and social security transfers it carries out
financial transactions in practice with every economic agent within its own
national territory. Therefore, an obligation to settle all public sector payments in
central bank money would immediately give the central bank a large market share
as supplier of settlement funds. With positive network externalities, that would
also enhance the value of public money in clearing private transactions.
Due to historical evolution, central banks normally have a large role as
settlement agents for their Government. In most countries central banks act as the
Government￿s debt agent, in charge of debt management for the State, even if
there has been some tendency to outsource such tasks from the central bank to
specialised State debt offices. As regards other financial transactions of the
Government, the involvement of the central bank varies considerable from
country to country. As regards Euro countries, in Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and
Portugal practically all Government transactions, such as debt issuance,
redemption and coupon activity, the collection of tax and social security
contributions, the acquisition of goods and services, the payment of public wages,
pensions and other social security benefits, are settled in central bank money
(ECB, 2000). In other Euro area countries, the Government has a settlement
account both at the central bank and at one or several commercial banks, and
public sector transactions are settled in central bank money in varying degree.
State debt management transactions are normally settled in central bank money in
all countries, whereas tax and social security contributions as well as wages,
pensions and other social security benefits are in many countries cleared through
commercial banks.
If state operations are settled in central bank money, the balance of Treasury
deposits at the central bank is affected by any operation conducted by the
Treasury. Indeed, at the aggregate Euro-area level, Treasury deposits with the
central bank are the most volatile item among the so-called autonomous factors (ie
the changes of the balance sheet of central banks neither related to monetary
policy operations nor to current account holdings of commercial banks with the
central bank). Even if central banks have devoted considerable resources to
estimate the net liquidity flows resulting from all transactions of the Government
with the private sector, volatility of Treasury deposits is sometimes problematic
for the Eurosystem￿s overall liquidity management. Thus, there has been a42
tendency to lower the Governments￿ deposit balances held at central banks. This
can be done by lower remuneration of these balances, which gives the Treasury an
incentive to invest excess funds in the money market, while continuing to settle
Government transactions in central bank money. A more radical way is
outsourcing the settlement of payments into the private banking sector, which
several Euro countries have partially done. For retail transactions, such as taxes
and wages, an outsourcing is also motivated by cost considerations, as
maintaining the necessary infrastructure for collecting and clearing payments may
be very expensive. However, the prospect of private e-settlement suggests that the
Government should continue to settle its securities, money market and forex
transactions in central bank money, if it wishes to safeguard the central bank￿s
position at the centre of the economy￿s settlement activity.
4.4 Market failure and central banking
An additional way to motivate a need for public liquidity starts from the premise
that private markets are inherently unstable, ie prone to systemic liquidity crisis,
where an abundant supply of legal tender money is the best remedy. Most models,
such as the Diamond-Dybvig one, motivate such market failure by
microeconomic financial market imperfections, which somehow render the
macroeconomy more vulnerable to unanticipated shocks. In many of those
models, the central bank￿s liquidity intervention can be used to make the
functioning of the private financial market more complete. However, in the classic
Diamond-Dybvig model a government deposit insurance system is also an
effective policy to solve the co-ordination problem of depositors. As deposit
insurance schemes are nowadays compulsory in most countries, the modern
financial system is hardly posed to classic deposit runs involving a massive flight
to currency. Furthermore, during the last decades the development of modern
money markets has greatly enhanced commercial banks￿ options for liquidity
management. Banks are increasingly using wholesale markets like the overnight
market or the CD (certificate of deposit) market to adjust their liquidity positions.
Due to the growth of repo markets banks can now obtain funds by selling or
repoing a vast range of assets. Even less liquid assets can be exchanged for
liquidity by means of securitisation. Thus, in principle there should be no limit to
the amount of liquidity that a bank can raise from the market against the value of
its assets. Under such circumstances one may well assume that markets should be
able to supply banks with sufficient liquidity without a need for a special lender of
last resort.
However, even if the development of money market trading and market
instruments has greatly enhanced banks￿ options for liquidity management, it has43
not removed the liquidity mismatch in banks￿ balance sheet structure, as the
amount of liquid assets generally falls short of the amount of liquid liabilities
(Herrala, 2001a). Furthermore, a considerable proportion of bank assets, notably
those which do not have full collateral or which cannot easily be securitised, are
of uncertain and state contingent value. In a bank specific crisis banks can use all
tradable assets, whether public or private, as liquidity because an idiosyncratic
shock does not affect market pricing. However, an aggregate shock may result in
a breakdown in market liquidity, which turns tradable assets into non-marketable
loans or at least induces large changes in prices. Therefore, in a systemic crisis the
continuation value of a bank may not be fully pledgeable to depositors and other
investors, and a bank can fail due to insufficient liquidity even if its continuation
is valuable to the society as a whole.
Indeed, some extensions of the D-D bank run model suggest that interbank
market could be akin to contagion where liquidity problems may be transferred
from one bank to another (Allen and Gale, 2000). In such models, an idiosyncratic
shock is amplified because there is an additional loss due to the costly liquidation
of the failed bank￿s loan portfolio. In other models, incentive effects provide an
explanation for the deficiency of the interbank market (Bhattacharya and Gale,
1987; Bhattacharya and Fulghieri, 1994). In those models banks use interbank
assets as reserve assets to free ride on other banks which leads to undesirably low
levels of liquidity and too much fragility in the banking sector. The breakdown of
the interbank market in those models gives a rational for a central bank lending
facility. Another strand of literature explains bank runs and interbank failure as a
consequence of sharp declines in asset positions rather than pure liquidity shocks
(Calomiris and Gorton, 1991; K￿ppl and MacGee, 2001). Such models are
especially relevant in explaining the potential for failure in modern financial
markets, where more and more trading is carried out against collateral. Finally, in
Cooper and Corbae (2001) fluctuations in confidence is the key source of
financial collapse. The central bank can eliminate confidence driven financial
collapse through liquidity provision.
The liquidity model by Holmstr￿m and Tirole also suggests a rational for
government-supplied liquidity and for its active management, but does not link
firms￿ demand for liquid assets directly to central banking. Herrala (2000) has
extended this model to address the issue whether markets can supply banks with
sufficient liquidity or whether markets should be complemented with a lender of
last resort. Herrala applies the liquidity model framework to banking and extends
the framework to admit the analysis of problems associated with transitory
liquidity outflows, even absent any change in a bank￿s value. The model suggests
two interesting results about the sufficiency of markets as a source of liquidity,
and the role of the lender of last resort. First, banks may find it hard to finance
even transitory liquidity shocks from the markets if moral hazard problems are
amplified by liquidity shocks. Moral hazard, interpreted as the possibility of laxity44
in banks￿ monitoring of firms, may increase with outflows of liquidity because in
that case banks would need to increase their monitoring efforts in order to
safeguard their own interests. Second, there are economies in reserve pooling that
arise from the ability of a pool to implement soft budget constraints for banks
experiencing liquidity shocks. An ability to issue legal tender reduces liquidity
costs further, as the need to prehoard costly reserves vanishes. A lender of last
resort (LOLR) can economise on reserve holdings when market transactions are
constrained by moral hazard.
Proponents of public money issue often refer to the perceived instability of
eighteenth and nineteenth century free banking experiences, when private banks
competed against each other to provide the public with currency. In contrast,
Hayek (1976) and other supporters of free banking claim that the instability of
banking systems is ultimately due to government regulation, such as legally
enforced fixed exchange rates between different kinds or money, which inhibits
the natural selection process towards the best sort of money among those issued
by the various agencies. They predict that, if not distorted by government
regulation, private incentives would guarantee an optimal response to liquidity
pressures. Indeed, private market has not been totally unable to innovate
responses to banks￿ high need for liquidity during periods when banks
experienced liquidity runs. Bank runs originate from an information asymmetry,
which makes it impossible to convince depositors or other creditors of the value
of bank portfolios. The banks themselves have some prerequisites to cope with the
problem, as they have special knowledge to value bank assets. Furthermore, as
banks have developed interbank relationships and offered lines of credit to their
correspondent banks, they also have expertise in monitoring and managing loans
to each other. Banks have also an incentive to avoid other members￿ failures
because with asymmetric information the failure of an individual bank can cause
changes in depositors￿ conditional expectations so that other banks also become
vulnerable to runs. For those reasons, banks tend to make arrangements to support
weaker members during panics.
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Some models of the banking system indeed suggest that banking panics
ultimately result from existing regulatory restrictions on banking, rather than
being inherent to private financial contracting. For example, in Champ, Smith and
Williamson (1996) panics occur when there are restrictions on the issue of
currency by private banks, but they do not occur if banks are unrestricted. Alike,
                                                
25 For example, during the Free Banking Era in the United States the New York Clearinghouse
authorised the issuance of loan certificates during banking panics. The member bank needing
currency to satisfy depositors￿ demands submitted part of its portfolio as collateral, and certificates
were issued amounting to a percentage of the market value of the collateral. The loan certificates
were acceptable in the clearing process not only because they were backed by discounted
securities, but also because they were claims on the clearinghouse, a joint liability of the members.45
in Calomiris (1999) protection against systemic shocks can be provided more
efficiently through private institutional arrangements such as clearing houses.
However, Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (2000) argue that while an
unregulated banking system based around a private clearing house arrangement
may dominate public safety nets in reducing moral hazard and therefore the scope
for individual bank insolvency, it also increases the likelihood of contagious bank
failures following a systemic shock. Herrala (2001b) compares private and public
schemes for liquidity provision by investigating how an idealised LOLR
formulates policy under alternative, public and private governance structures. In
the model, the first best LOLR-scheme always covers the whole banking sector
and offers full insurance to the participants. The model suggests that voluntary
schemes succeed relatively well as lender of last resort in situations where
recipients of LOLR assistance can repay the LOLR loan with interest. The
conclusion changes when the ability of banks to repay the LOLR credit is limited.
When lending is associated with losses for the LOLR, good quality banks will
tend to stay out of the LOLR scheme. In that case, a compulsory scheme such as a
central bank, which can impose a reserve requirement on banks, has an advantage
over voluntary schemes.
5 Conclusions
Advances in information processing technology and in communications are
transforming the financial landscape. Real-time access to financial information,
electronic trading and electronic means of payment are nowadays standard for
wholesale financial markets. Even in the retail side electronic card payments have
largely substituted for traditional cash, whose position is further challenged by the
latest innovation for retail payments ￿ the e-cash. Those innovations are
contributing to the microeconomic efficiency of the finance and payment industry,
and should therefore be welcomed by central banks and other authorities. On the
other hand, such innovations are also threatening to erode the private sector
demand for the monetary base, which is often seen as the cornerstone for effective
monetary control in the economy. The potential conflict between the goals of
microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic stabilisation raises several crucial
questions for central bankers world-wide. For example, how real is the threat that
innovations in payment technology will ultimately lead to erosion of private-
sector demand for monetary liabilities of the central bank? Does it matter for the
conduct of monetary policy? If it does, should the central bank use some
regulatory measures to safeguard its power for monetary control? Which measures
are likely to be the most effective in safeguarding the public monetary control and
at the same time the least distortive in terms of resource allocation?46
At present, the research community is offering mixed answers to such
questions. Our preliminary analysis of the issue makes no difference in this
regard. On one hand, money can be viewed as a communication device invented
to facilitate the exchange of goods and services between economic agents. In this
sense, advances in information and communication technology are clearly
challenging the role of central bank money by providing speedier and more
sophisticated devices to record private transactions. On the other hand, it can also
be argued that the provision of money is a natural monopoly, which complements
the imperfect functioning of private financial markets. Those competing views on
the nature of money suggest quite different future for central banking.
If central bank money is simply seen as a unit of account that most people use
to record mutual or multilateral exchange, it is easy to imagine a future where
private entities use other monetary standards to contract with each other. In such a
world, the degree of control that the central bank has over the nation’s monetary
conditions depends upon how many economic agents still choose to contract in
terms of the public currency issued by the central bank. Clearly, if need be, the
government has at its disposal several instruments to foster the use of public
money. Such measures include an obligation to use central bank money to settle
some vital transactions (eg interbank liabilities) in central bank money, or an
exclusive use of public money for the settlement of government payments.
However, the costs of coercive regulation are likely to increase with increasing
sophistication of private financial markets. Therefore, similarly to other public
services, microeconomic efficiency considerations are pressing for further
￿privatisation￿ of the payment and settlement industry.
On the other hand, if the provision of (base) money is seen as a natural
monopoly, there need not be any conflict between microeconomic efficiency and
macroeconomic policy considerations. The use of money is clearly subject to
large network externalities, as the settlement value of money increases with the
number of other agents who accept it for exchange. Clearly, both theory and
evidence seem to suggest that in the absence of regulation money, as other types
of medium of exchange, are oligopolistically supplied. However, there are also
arguments, both theoretical and empirical, suggesting that such oligopoly markets
for money issue are inherently unstable, and need to be complemented by publicly
regulated supply of ultimate clearing funds. In this case, some degree of public
monopoly in the provision of payment and settlement services would serve both a
structural and governmental need, and would be beneficial for an orderly
functioning of private financial markets.
The importance of the issue and the present state of the debate advocate
further research to model the implementation of monetary policy in an
environment of competitive money supply, taking into account the perceived
future infastructure for payment and settlement services. As the ability to set the
economy￿s short-term interest rate is the core of modern central banking, the47
modelling approach could focus on the determination of the overnight interest rate
in a system, where competing private and public monies are available for
settlement. By adding the demand for competitive settlement funds, the model
would allow an analysis of factors that may have an impact on the public sector￿s
chances to control the level of interest rates in the future economy. Such an
analysis might also bring about useful insight into the future role of the central
bank in the payment system, both as a provider and as a regulator of payment
services.48
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Annex 1.
Financial Magnitudes in the Euro Area
Due to technological advances and financial innovation the size of central bank
liabilities has steadily declined relative to other financial magnitudes. As shown in
Table 1, the largest liability item of the Eurosystem, currency in circulation, only
accounts for 7.1 per cent of Euro area broad money (M3). Even the size of total
monetary base does not exceed 10 per cent of broad money. Still more striking is
the disparity between the magnitude of commercial banks￿ settlement reserves
held at Eurosystem central banks and the volume of outstanding liquid market
instruments, such as government securities, which banks can hold in their
portfolios as secondary reserves. Also, looking at the asset side of central banks,
the total central bank credit in the Euro area only accounts for a tiny part of gross
funding requirements by all Euro area Monetary Financial Institutions.
Table 1. Comparison of Financial Magnitudes
in the Euro Area, EUR billion
December 1999 December 2000
Free reserves 1.2 0.4
Total bank reserves 106.6 117.6
Currency in circulation 354.2 360.4
Monetary base 460.8 478.0
Gross Eurosystem credit to MFIs 250.1 268.6
Net Eurosystem credit to MFIs 132.7 144.0
Narrow money (M1) 1964.0 2074.3
Broad money (M3) 4791.0 5080.0
Government paper held by Euro are MFIs 1124.6 993.0
Total short-term Treasury securities 258.5 263.8
Total long-term Treasury securities 2974.8 3088.5
Aggregated balance sheet of MFIs 15534.6 16711.453
Annex 2.
The channel system applied by the Eurosystem
The ECB has also adopted the channel framework for implementing monetary
policy for the Euro area, despite the fact that it also uses a minimum reserve
system with averaging provisions. This might partly reflect lower willingness to
use open market operations to accommodate daily shifts in reserve demand, due to
highly decentralised operational set-up for the Eurosystem. The Eurosystem offers
a marginal lending facility, through which it stands ready to supply an arbitrary
amount of overnight settlement cash at a fixed interest rate (r
M), which is higher
than the target overnight interest rate. The Eurosystem also applies a deposit
facility where commercial banks have the right to deposit excess settlement cash
over-night with national central banks at a deposit rate (r
D), which is lower than
the target rate. Open market operations are then used to supply an amount of
settlement cash (eOR), which the ECB estimates to clear the overnight market at
the target interest rate. In practice, the target overnight rate is indicated through
the average or minimum tender rate applied in weekly main refinancing
operations (r
T), which have normally stayed at the middle of the band whose
upper and lower bounds are set by the marginal lending rate and the deposit rate.











The main function of ECB reserve requirements is through averaging provisions
to render the demand for reserves in the euro reserve market more interest-elastic
(like D1), whereas the demand curve tends to be relatively steep (like D2) in a
system without averaging provisions. The use of averaging provisions also allows
for a relatively large width of the band between the lending rate and the deposit
rate in the Euro-system framework. However, neither of these features changes54
the basic functioning of the channel system. The vertical segment of the reserve
supply curve (S) in Figure 1 corresponds to the ECB￿s settlement cash target, ie
the average level of settlement cash that banks demand at the target overnight rate.
In the euro reserve market, the settlement cash target has been around EUR 700
million (Bindseil and Seitz, 2001).
The theory suggests that the demand for settlement balances is a function of
the location of the overnight rate relative to the marginal lending rate and deposit
rate, but independent of the absolute level of these rates. Therefore, the
adjustment of the level of the overnight rate by the central bank need not require
any change in the supply target for settlement cash, as long as the location of the
lending and deposit rates relative to the target overnight rate do not change. This
result allows the Governing Council of the ECB to move market rates by changes
in standing facility rates without a need to frequently modify its instructions on
open market operations. Indeed, since April 1999, the ECB has applied a
symmetric corridor where the deposit rate has stayed one percentage point below
and the marginal lending rate one percentage point above the tender rate, ie the
target overnight rate. The Governing Council has implemented interest rate policy
by changing the three key central bank rates in tandem, whereas the Executive
Board has run liquidity management with the aim to achieve the target amount for
settlement cash.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the actual overnight rate (EONIA) has normally
closely followed the ECB tender rate. However, in some periods, acute
expectations of changes in central bank rates have tended to push the overnight
rate apart from the prevailing tender rate. Also, unexpected shifts in reserve
demand at the end of the reserve maintenance period have effected transitory
changes in overnight rates. However, transitory changes in the overnight rate do
not compromise the transparency of the ECB monetary policy, as they do not
convey any signals on the future path of interest rates.55
Figure 2. The ECB tender rate and the overnight rate
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1
2
1 The ECB tender rate (main refinancing rate/
minimum bid rate)
2 The overnight rate (EONIA)56
Annex 3.
Payment instructions processed by selected interbank funds
transfer systems in Europe




￿ domestic 134312 148725 159383
￿ cross-border 28704 39899 44489
Euro 1 (EBA) 67895 97067 111525
EAF (Euro Access Frankfurt) 46705 51041 52238
PNS (Paris Net Settlement) 20083 21759 32172
SEPI (Servicio Espanol de Pagos Interbancarios) 4261 3837 4620
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